CSEES Analyses
So the rift has finally happened. After months of increasing tension within the anti-communist Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), its former leader?and former prime minister?Ivan Kostov has broken away, taking with him the majority of the party?s parliamentarians. His new party will be formed in May, it seems. What does it mean for the politics of the right in Bulgaria? And what might it mean for the results of the next parliamentary elections, which must take place in summer next year at the latest?
For Kostov, the precedents are at first sight not very encouraging. Over the years a succession of groups have broken away from the UDF and none has done very well as a result. Either they have disappeared into political obscurity directly, or done so after a spell in government on the basis of pre-existing parliamentary seats, or they have come to terms with the UDF and run as its junior partners in the next election.
This seems unlikely in the case of Kostov, however. He was still the UDF?s most substantial figure up to the time of the split, and his group is both considerably larger than earlier bands of UDF defectors and, unlike all others, has represented a defection to the right, rather than towards the centre. Current leader Nadezhda Mihailova may now have the UDF ?trademark?, but Kostov & Co can lay claim to its distinctive brand of anti-communism. This has continued appeal to some Bulgarians, while Kostov?s exposition of it and his personal style can still motivate significant numbers of activists. Enough, in both cases, to ensure the new party comfortable entry to the next parliament, most likely with between 20 and 30 MPs.
For Mihailova, the split greatly increases her freedom of manoeuvre. Re-elected at the recent national conference by a massive majority?of those delegates who did not boycott the event, at least?she is unchallenged for the moment, even if she may in the longer run have difficulties with ?elder statesmen? like former premier Filip Dimitrov and former president Petur Stoyanov. With the Kostovites gone, she is also free to form alliances that were previously either impossible or possible only at the cost of severe ructions within her party.
There are several possibilities. Most obviously, Stefan Sofianski and his Free Democrats?a popular politician leading an organisationally negligible party. Quite possibly, the right wing of the Simeon II National Movement (SIINM), should this split off or should the SIINM disintegrate. Maybe even the SIINM as a whole, given suitable terms. And conceivably the mainly ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), regarded as anathema by Kostov: Mihailova has been notably conciliatory and MRF leader Ahmed Dogan reciprocated, no doubt keen to hedge his bets and avoid overdependence on the BSP. Almost every group except the BSP itself, in short, and probably Kostov?s new party: the split will be too recent, and Kostov?s temper too sectarian, for a partial reconciliation by the time of the next elections.
Assuming, that is, that the UDF remains a force to be reckoned with and thus an ally worth having. Again, this is not a foregone conclusion. Kostov has arguably taken part of the UDF?s ?soul? with him. And Mihailova?s track record in increasing the UDF?s popular appeal and redefining what the movement is about has not been spectacularly successful in the past two years. Given the free hand that she has now, though, she might be able to do better. One factor in her favour is that Kostov does not so far appear to have taken with him as much of the UDF rank and file, of the party machine, as might have been expected. There are good pragmatic reasons for giving Mihailova a chance, while organisation will remain an electoral asset for some time to come even if the UDF?s identity is not as clear as it might be. If the UDF runs on its own, in the next election, a parliamentary contingent of between 30 and 40 would represent reasonable success?and is a reasonable aspiration.
The right?s votes will probably not be dangerously split, not at any rate in the sense that many votes will be wasted by being cast for groups that fall below the 4% threshold needed to qualify for parliament. Sofianski is personally popular enough to ensure his group?s entry into parliament despite its organisational weakness. If the People?s Union?the UDF?s coalition ally at the last elections?is not confident of winning the necessary votes in alliance with other small groupings, the UDF alliance will presumably still be open to them. A right-wing SIINM splinter group, if the question arises, will most likely find electoral allies if it needs them. If the SIINM holds together and looks rightwards, on the other hand, it will still have a sizeable parliamentary contingent, even if it is only a third of its strength at the last election.
The situation will be a complicated one, however, in three senses. First, especially assuming that the Kostovites hold aloof from coalitions, much will depend on the attitude of the MRF, the only certainty about whose conduct is that it will make use of whatever leverage it has. Second, if right-of-centre forces manage to make common cause against the BSP?before or after the election?they may not stay united for long. And third, the more complicated the politics, the better the conditions for the grupirovki, the economic groupings that some would argue are the real puppet masters in the Bulgarian political theatre. A weak executive and a parliamentary faction heavy with undeclared representatives of these groupings have been an ideal context for the exercise of their influence. Power partly in the hands of a fragmented right would be hardly less ideal.
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